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Assessing	the	impact	of	new	European	defence
initiatives	on	transatlantic	relations
The	European	Union	is	in	the	process	of	implementing	a	number	of	new	defence	initiatives,	notably	a
new	Permanent	Structured	Cooperation	on	security	and	defence	(PESCO)	and	a	European	Defence
Fund.	Antonio	Calcara	examines	how	these	new	initiatives	are	likely	to	affect	relations	with	the	United
States,	with	some	figures	in	the	US	already	expressing	concern	that	the	new	initiatives	could
marginalise	US	companies	from	the	European	defence	market.
Dutch	soldiers	during	the	European	Best	Squad	Competition	in	Bavaria,	Germany,	Credit:	U.S.	Army	photo	by	Sgt.	Terry
Rajsombath	(CC	BY	2.0)
The	next	few	months	will	be	crucial	for	the	development	of	the	new	Permanent	Structured	Cooperation	on	security
and	defence	(PESCO).	After	the	European	Council’s	agreement	on	the	first	seventeen	collaborative	projects	to
develop	in	this	framework,	member	states	will	have	to	agree	on	a	common	set	of	rules	to	develop	these	projects	and
on	the	conditions	that	will	define	the	potential	participation	of	third	countries’	states	or	industries.
The	PESCO	framework	is	also	closely	linked	to	the	new	“European	Defence	Fund“,	promoted	by	the	European
Commission,	which	provides	a	budget	of	500	million	euros	to	finance	military	research	as	part	of	the	multi-year
budget	for	2021-2027.	The	aim	of	this	fund	is	to	help	member	states	increase	their	defence	spending.	At	the
moment,	the	28	member	states	spend	a	total	of	1.34%	of	gross	domestic	product	on	defence.	Without	the	UK,	the
rate	falls	to	1.32	%.	The	fund	will	consist	of	a	research	and	a	capability	window.	The	fund’s	research	window	will
finance	research	and	development	cooperation	for	developing	defence	products	and	technologies	at	the	EU	level,
while	the	capability	window	will	assist	member	states	in	joint	purchases	of	equipment	and	common	investments	for
defence	procurement.
These	initiatives	were	embraced	in	a	contradictory	manner	by	the	US	administration.	On	the	one	hand,	the	EU
defence	efforts	were	welcomed	by	a	US	administration	that	has	made	defence	spending	and	burden	sharing	a
“centrepiece”	of	its	relationship	with	NATO	allies.	In	this	regard,	the	relationship	between	EU	defence	and	NATO
continues	to	be	particularly	delicate.	Katie	Wheelbarger,	the	US	principal	deputy	assistant	secretary	for	international
security	affairs,	declared	“we	are	supportive	of	it	(referring	to	the	European	Defence	Fund),	as	long	as	it	is
complementary	to	and	not	distracting	from	NATO’s	activities	and	requirements”	(…)	“we	don’t	want	to	see	EU	efforts
pulling	requirements	of	forces	away	from	NATO	and	into	the	EU”.	These	comments	were	echoed	by	the	NATO
Secretary	General,	Jens	Stoltenberg,	who	declared	“it	is	important	for	Europeans	to	state	again	and	again	that	it	is
not	competition	for	NATO	or	an	alternative	to	NATO”.
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On	the	other	hand,	besides	the	sensitive	relationship	between	the	EU	and	NATO,	PESCO	and	the	European
Defence	Fund	have	worried	the	US	administration	when	it	comes	to	defence-industrial	issues.	For	instance,	the
American	ambassador	to	NATO,	Kay	Bailey	Hutchinson,	warned	that	Washington	did	not	want	PESCO	or	a	new
European	Defence	Fund	“to	be	a	protectionist	vehicle	for	the	EU”.	In	this	regard,	particularly	relevant	is	the	fact	that
the	European	Defence	Fund	foresees	that	funds	will	be	spent	to	support	exclusively	European-owned	companies.	In
particular,	the	French	political	establishment	is	promoting	the	criteria	of	“effective	control”,	aiming	to	exclude	extra-
European	companies	from	being	able	to	take	advantage	of	European	funds.	This	certainly	poses	problems	to	US
industries,	given	their	strong	links	with	European	industries	(especially	with	the	UK,	Italy	and	Sweden).
According	to	the	US	administration,	therefore,	the	recent	European	initiatives	in	the	defence	sector	would	aim	to
introduce	a	“buy	European”	preference	and	to	marginalise	US	companies	from	the	European	market.	This	would
have	negative	repercussions	on	the	US	economy,	as	evidenced	by	the	recent	$3.2	billion	sale	of	the	US	air	and
missile	defence	(AMD)	Patriot	System	to	Sweden.	However,	in	the	past,	European	countries	were	continuously
concerned	about	the	US	strongly	protected	defence-industrial	market	and	by	the	lack	of	reciprocity	and	equal
regulation	of	the	EU	and	US	defence	technological	and	industrial	base,	especially	for	what	concerns	access	to
advanced	capabilities,	unrestricted	use	of	exported	arms	and	rules	governing	property	rights	over	technologies.
Assuming	the	importance	of	transatlantic	and	NATO	relations	for	European	and	international	security,	and	given	the
recent	tensions	between	the	EU	and	US	on	defence-industrial	matters,	what	could	overcome	this	impasse?	From	the
European	perspective,	patient	diplomatic	work	is	certainly	needed	to	show	to	the	US	how	stronger	EU	defence-
industrial	cooperation	could	actually	strengthen	NATO,	generating	more	military	efficiencies	in	both	organisations.	In
this	regard,	it	will	also	be	important	to	find	a	partnership	with	the	UK	on	defence-industrial	issues	and	to	involve	its
competitive	defence	industry	in	some	of	the	collaborative	projects.	Given	the	military	weight	of	the	UK	in	Europe	and
NATO,	this	would	certainly	boost	the	recent	EU	defence	initiatives.
From	the	US	viewpoint,	it	is	necessary	to	understand,	as	suggested	by	Jonathan	Caverley,	how	European	global
competitiveness	in	the	arms	trade	can	serve	broader	American	political	goals,	especially	regarding	the	strength	of
the	Atlantic	Alliance	and	the	common	threats	that	the	EU	and	US	will	have	to	face	in	the	short	and	medium	term:
including	Russia’s	growing	assertiveness,	terrorist	threats	and	political	instability	in	North	Africa	and	the	Middle	East.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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